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Abstract 
This paper studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. 1 
motivate the dynamics as the result of a process by which agents change the 
strategy they use when its performance is not satisfactory. 1 show that un-
der these dynamics strictly dominated strategies are eliminated even in the 
presence of nonvanishing perturbations. 1 also provide sufficient conditions for 
the existence of a unique ergodic distribution and give examples that show that 
the stochastic dynamics in this paper have equilibrium selection properties that 
differ from those of other stochastic dynamics in the literature. 
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1. INTRODUCfION 
The current interest in evolutive dynamics was born from a discussion of the 
foundations of game theory, whose emphasis on equilibria seemed to make excessive 
demands on the rationality of agents. As an alternative, it was thought that equilibrium 
may be the result of the repeated interaction of agents who are less strategically 
sophisticated than the traditional theory supposes. There are precedents here, since 
Cournot himself gave a dynamic explanation for how the equilibrium for his oligopoly 
game would come to be. 
This paper studies stochastic selection systems, in the context of games. 1 work 
with a particular dynamic system, the replicator dynamics, which 1 will try to show has 
interpretations beyond the usual evolutionary ones. These dynamics model agents with a 
very low degree of sophistication. Despite the agents' lack of sophistication, I find that 
even in the presence of stochastic shocks of several kinds the dynamics give little 
asymptotic weight to strictIy dorninated strategies. 1 also give sufficient conditions for the 
stochastic dynarnics to have an ergodic distribution. 
When considering the replicator dynamics it is useful to think of a large 
population of agents who use pure strategies and are randomly matched to play against 
each other. The growth rate of the proportion of players using a certain pure strategy is 
the difference between the expected payoff of that pure strategy, given the proportions of 
players using every pure strategy, and the average expected payoff in that population. In. 
contrast to other dynamics that have been proposed, like the best-response dynamics of 
Matsui [16], the fictitious play of Brown [2] and Robinson [23], or the learning papers of 
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Milgrom and Roberts [17] and Fudenberg and Kreps [12], the replicator dynamics have 
the characteristic that the strategies whose weight in the population increase need not be 
best responses to anything, in particular to past outcomes of play. And even in these 
circumstances, it can be shown, (see Cabrales and Sobel [3]) that if selection operates 
slowly enough or in continuous time, then all limit points of the dynarnics are best 
responses to time averages of past play, thus giving sorne support to the notion that 
agents that are not rational behave as if they were. 
The history of stochastic selection processes is not long, in part because the 
techniques are relative newcomers also. An early article was written by M. J. Farrell [9] 
at a time when most of the discussion on selection was done in tenns of detenninistic 
dynamics. The main concem of the literature on selection dynamics was whe~er the 
assumption of profit maximization was a sensible one to use for the theory of the finn. 
One possible argument in favor of the idea was that non-profit maximizers would tend to 
grow less or become bankrupt more often, thus making an ever shrinking proportion of 
the industry. Winter [31] has a more extensive discussion of this argument. Farrell uses 
branching processes to model a situation where several different "ability" groups are 
characterized by their probability of success. He then calculates the relative 
preponderance of the difIerent groups. He also considers the introduction of new entrants 
to the groups. The fate of strictIy dominated actions and the implications of a stream of 
disoriented new entrants are two of the themes I will address. Farrell' s work is concemed 
with pure decision problems in a small population setting, though. In a more recent 
paper, Foster and Young [lO], develop a model where perturbations, which they describe 
by Wiener processes, are constantIy affecting the replicator dynamics and keeping the 
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process within the interior of the simplex. Kandori, Mailath and Rob [14] and Young 
[32] consider explicitly a case with finite populations where the randomness comes from 
the stochastic replacements of agents by newcomers that start by playing something at 
random. In the three previous models the processes have ergodic distributions, and the 
authors arrive at predictions by looking at the limit of these ergodic distributions when 
the variance of the noise goes to zero. Papers by Samuelson [241, Noldeke, Samuelson 
and Van Damme [20], and Kandori and Rob [15] apply the techniques in Kandori, 
Mailath and Rob [14] and Young [32] to a variety of games, including cheap ta1k, pure 
coordination games and supermodular games. This approach has proven useful because 
it has been able to discriminate between strict equilibria, something most refinements and 
other dynamic systems were unable to distinguish. An exception is Crawford's [4] paper 
where he shows that in sorne games strategic uncertainty and adaptive adjustments can 
give rise to systematic equilibrium selection pattems without having to depend on an 
ergodic distribution. Crawford [5] shows that in finite populations evolutionary stability 
is also capable of selecting between strict equilibria. 
The model that I will use was first developed by Fudenberg and Harris [11], for 
a two player, two strategy, symmetric game. I will study games that are not necessarily 
symmetric with multiple players and strategies. Like Fudenberg and Harris, I define the 
replicator dynamics in continuous time, and the state variables are points in the simplex. 
One difference with the Foster and Young paper is that the source of the shocks becomes 
important, and we distinguish between aggregate shocks to payoffs and mutations. In the 
fourth section I show that strictly dominated strategies become rare when selection has 
been operating for a long time. This extends the result found by Fudenberg and Harris for 
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their class of games. In the sixth section I show that for a two strategy, N-player, 
symmetric game with two strict equilibria, the equilibriurn selected by the dynamics used 
in rny paper is different frorn the one that the dynamics used by Kandori, Mailath and 
Rob would select. In the class of garnes that Fudenberg and Harris study both kinds of 
dynamics select the sarne equilibria, if rnutations are possible, because in a game with 
two players the payoffs are linear in the proportion ofplayers using every strategy. 
The shocks captured by the rnodel in this paper, as in Fudenberg and Harris, are 
of two types. There are individual, uncorrelated changes of strategy, produced by the 
entry of uninfonned players. Since I assurne there is no correlation in these changes and 
the population is very large, I rnodel these shocks as detenninistic shifts to the replicator 
dynamics, which is how traditional rnodels of biological selection tend to include 
rnutations. There are also aggregate shocks that affect payoffs in the same way for all 
users of a strategy. These will not average out; they constitute the part of rny rnodel that 
is explicitIy stochastic. For a first approxirnation they are considered uncorrelated across 
time. Since the rnodel is fonnulated in continuous time Wiener processes are an 
adequate way to rnodel thern. The sixth section extends the ergodicity resolt in 
Fudenberg and Harris to games with rnultiple players and strategies. 
The second section of the paper will be devoted to a description and rnotivation 
of the replicator dynamics. 1 will argue that the replicator dynamics can be thought of as 
the reduced fonn of a process of irnitation or of economic survival, and present a class of 
dynamic systerns, first introduced by Srnallwood and Conlisk [27], of which the 
replicator dynamics are a special case. In the third section I will introduce the rnodel with 
shocks. In the fourth section I will prove that if the variance of the noise is not too large, 
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when the mutation rates are smaller and smaller the system tends to give less and less 
weight lO strictly dominated strategies. The fifth section deals with the existence and 
uniqueness of an ergodic measure. The sixth section presents an example that highlights 
the differences between the model in this paper and other stochastic dynarnics. The 
seventh section shows that for members of the Smallwood-Conlisk farnily of dynarnics 
other than the replicator dynamics, strictly dominated strategies need not be eliminated. 
This happens even for dynamics that are close, in a parametric sense, to the replicator 
dynarnics. Then 1 conclude the papero 
2. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 
The game considered here will have finitely many pure strategies and players. 
There are N players and the pure strategy set for the ith player is Pi which ·has ni 
N 
strategies. Player k's payoff function is uk : .llPi ~ R. Let Sn denote the standard n-l 1=1 
dimensional simplex. Uk is extended to the space of mixed strategies in the usual way, 
and je Pi wiil be identified with the mixed strategy that gives probability one to the pure 
strategy j. Suppose there are N populations of agents, one for each player, and each of 
them contains a continuum of individuals. The usual interpretation of the replicator 
dynarnics is that they describe the evolution of the proportion of members of each 
population playing every strategy. Payoffs in that case represent reproductive fitness, or 
the number of successors for the user of a strategy given the makeup of the population. 
Let xj(t) be the proportion of members of the ith player population using 
strategy j at time 1. The replicator dynarnics are defined as follows; 
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To justify the dynamics imagine that the individuals are randomIy matched dur-
ing period t to play the game. They learn their payoff. A small portion of them are then 
taken and randomIy paired with members of the same player population. They compare 
payoffs and the one with lower payoff changes to the strategy of the one with higher 
payofI with a probability that is proportional to the difIerence in payoffs. This could hap-
pen for example if the agents had an idiosyncratic uniformIy distributed cost of changing 
strategies, and decided to change only when the difference in payoffs were higher than 
the cost of changing strategies. Nachbar [18] gives a similar interpretation for the repli-
cator dynamics. 
For an economist it is difficult to accept an explanation for a model that makes 
agents behave on the basis of information that is so limited, instead of using more sophis-
ticated infonnation gathering and processing techniques. Not everybody shares this 
belief, however. Nisbett and Ross [19] report experimental results in which the opinions 
cornmunicated in person by others have a stronger effect on decision makers than written 
infonnation that is statistically more relevant In rny opinion, the weakness of the replica-
tor dynamics lies in the fact that the scope of the agents' research is limited, both in the 
number of people consulted, and the amount of past experience used; and in the unifor-
mity of the leaming rule assumed for all the population. The result in section 4 extends 
one conclusion obtained for the replicator dynamics to a perturbed version of the model, 
and the example in section 7 shows the necessity of additional assumptions to extend the 
conclusions even further. This implies that for practical applications the particular way in 
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which agents adapt needs to be taken into consideration. 
I want to consider now a different interpretation for the replicator dynamics, 
which may help in connecting them to other selection models in the economic literature 
and illuminate the results in the remaining sections of the paper. The main behavioral 
hypothesis for this interpretation is that human economic agents are satisficers, and 
change their actions only when the action they are currentIy taking does not perfonn 
better than a preset standard. Winter [31], for example, proposes a model with this 
characteristic as an alternative to profit maximization by finns. In a consumers' choice 
model, proposed by Smallwood and Conlisk [27], the task is to choose between N 
di1ferent brands, differentiated by their probabilities of perfonning unsatisfactorily, b¡ for 
brand i. A consumer that owns a product that doesn't break down in a certain period pur-
chases the same brand in the next periodo If the product breaks down, he chooses next 
period's brand randomly. One possibility would be to give the same weight to all brands, 
another would be to purchase the most popular brand. In general the consumer could be 
somewhat sensitive to market popularity, without necessarily adopting such extreme pro-
cedures. Maybe the procedure consists of picking the first brand in the shelf and shelf 
space is only partially sensitive to market power. Smallwood and Conlisk summarlzed 
these possibilities by parametrizing the model in the following way. Let the market share 
of brand i be mi, then the probability that a consumer chooses i is 
m~ 1 
N ' where a. ~ O 
l:m~ 
k=l 
is the parameter that controls the importance of popularity. When a. = O popularity is 
unimportant for the consumers' choice; when a. is infinity only the most popular brand 
will be chosen; when a is exactly one the probabilities are exactIy the same as the market 
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shares. Given that the individuals ehoose independentIy, if the total number of eonsumers 
is large, the law of large numbers guarantees that the error made in identifying the fre-
queneies with which aetions are taken in the population with the probabilities that eaeh 
individual will take them is small. Then the dynamies that regulate the evolution of 
market shares can be expressed, 
m¡(t)a 
m·(t+l) = m·(t)(l - b·) + "'t'b·m·(t) . 
1 1 1 t J J l)nr(t)a 
r 
Now suppose that instead of a eonsumer ehoosing a brand we are looking at 
player i in our game who is choosing strategies. Total payoffs for strategy j are given by 
UiG,X-i) plus an idiosyncratic uniformly distributed random shock with support [a, b]. 
This is intented to model the faet that people are taking many decisions at the same time 
and knowledge about their payoffs in a particular case can be gathered only imperfectIy. 
Agents change their strategies when total payoff is less than a certain acceptable level, 
call it c. Let's assume that the constants a and b are such that ~ax uiG,k) ~ c - a and 
I,J,k 
~ikn uiG,k) ~ c - b. With these constraints on a and b any strategy at any time can either 
1,], 
give a payoff above the acceptable level or fail to do so with positive probability. If the 
performance of a strategy is adequate agents keep using it. If it is not they choose stra-
tegy j in the next period with probability (xit . The probability that strategy j fails 
L(x~)a 
k 
for a player is equal to 
(j -1) C - ui ,x - a 
b-a and the probability that it doesn't is 
b-c+u·G x-i) 
b l' • The dynamics that result for the population shares are, 
-a 
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If a = 1 we can rewrite the expression in the following way, 
. . ~OO . .. 
x'(t+l) = xJ'(t) + --[ u¡(j,x-1(t» - U¡(x1(t),X-1(t»]. 
J b-a 
This is the discrete time version of the replicator dynamics. By reducing the 
period length, and simultaneously reducing the probability of failure at a particular 
period (say raising b), in the appropriate way, we can obtain the continuous time version 
that I will work with in subsequent sections. 
3. THE MODEL WITH SHOCKS 
1 want to consider now the introduction of shocks to the replicator dynamics. 
The mst type of shocks includes those that affect the payoffs of a11 users of a strategy in 
the same way. They could be random changes in total demand in an oligopoly game 
where oligopolists face the same demand curve, or changes in the legal system that make 
certain strategies more costly, or changes in factor prices that alter the cost of using a 
technology. The sum of these shocks will be modeled as a Wiener process. These are 
continuous-time stochastic processes with almost surely continuous sample paths and sta-
tionary independent increments with mean zero. Let W be a d-dimensional Wiener pro-
cess, <Jj a d-dimensional vector of positive constants. The instantaneous payoff for the 
user of strategy j of population i at time t is, 
. d . 
dü¡(j, t) = uiG,x-1(t»dt + LCJj1dW1(t). 
1=1 
At a particular instant in time a player in the ith population is matched with a . 
player from each of the other N-l populations. The probability that a randornIy chosen 
member of the kth population uses strategy j is xf(t). The payoff for a player in the ¡th 
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d . 
population using strategy j will be U¡U,x-¡(t»dt plus a random quantity Lcrj1dW1(t). 
1=1 
These random quantities are independent over time, have a zero mean and constant vari-
ance. W¡(t) is independent of Wj(t), when i is different from j, and dWi(t) does not 
depend on x(t). 
If payoffs have this structure and x(t) evolves according to the replicator dynam-
ics, x(t) will be an Ito diffusion which is the name given to stochastic processes satisfying 
a stochastic differential equation, in this case; 
[ 
d ni nid .. 1 
dxj(t) = xj(t) Ui U,x-i(t»dt + L crjl dW1 (t) - L X~(t)Ui (k,x-i(t»dt - 1: 1:x~(t)crbdWI (t) . 
1=1 k=1 k= 11= 1 
One of the characteristics of replicator dynamics is that if a strategy disappears 
or is never in the population it will never reappear again. This happens because you can-
not imitate a strategy that nobody is using, or inherit it in a biological context And it will 
be true independently of the payoff of that strategy, thus the shocks I modeled above will 
not change that. A strategy that is represented in the population at the initial time will not 
disappear, almost surely, in finite time with the replicator dynamics. The reason is that 
the dynamics are defined in terms of the growth rates, and growth rates are finite, 
although perhaps negative, so the fastest possible decreasing path for a variable is a 
negative exponential one, which is zero only in the limit In similar finite-state models, 
by contrast, extinction is a definite possibility. For the stochastic dynamics in Farrell's [9] 
paper, for instance, there is a positive probability that even the users of the best strategies 
become bankrupt, although the expectation of their share of the total wealth in the market 
goes to one as time goes to infinity. 
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1 want to incorporate in the model the possibility that strategies that are not used 
by anybody in a given period stan to be used in later periods, while retaining the assurnp-
tion that the agents are not sophisticated. For this reason 1 assurne that new players 
replace pan of the population at all times and sorne of thern adopt strategies in a randorn 
way that is independent of the actions of both old players and other new players. 1 rnodel 
the effect of these new players in the dynarnics as a deterministic shock that rnodifies the 
transition rates for all periods. The aggregate effect of the newcorners that take actions at 
random is modeled in a deterministic fashion because their actions are assumed to be 
uncorrelated across individuals and the population is so large that we can invoke the law 
of large numbers to assurne that the average of these actions is not random. By the next 
time these new players can change their strategies they start behaving like other members 
of the population. By analogy with the biological literature I call these newcomers 
mutants, and their actions, mutations. Samuelson and Zhang [25] discuss the issues that 
come up when mistakes occur at the irnplementation stage, so that people don't a1ways 
choose the strategy they intend, but sorne other. These mistakes don't persist and are not 
inherited. The distinction appears to be important for the purpose of predicting whether 
outcomes ruled out by perfectness and other tremble-based refinements will persist in 
evolutionary contexts. In particular, the presence of mutations does not rule out imperfect 
equilibria as limit points of the dynarnics, while implernentation mistakes do. 
The new rnodel is then, 
[ 
d ni 
dxj(t) = xj(t) UiG,x-i(t»dt + LajldWl(t) - LX~(t)Ui(k,x-i(t»dt 
1=1 k=l 
(1) 
- ~ ix~(t)abdWl(t)l + ~ A.jkx~(t)dt - ~ A.~jxj(t)dt. 
k= 11= 1 k=l k=l 
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A.k is the probability that a member of population i that is using strategy k will be 
replaced in a given period by a player who chooses randomly strategy j . 1 will call the 
A.k 's mutation rates. Notice that 1..1 can have any value without affecting the dynamics. 1 
will choose to make 1..1 = mi~A.jk to economize notation in the proofs of the propositions. 
k:FJ 
4. STRIC1LY DOMINATED STRATEGIES 
One of the first questions to arise when considering selection dynamics that 
come from less than rational behavior is whether the outcomes generated resemble the 
ones predicted from a rationality perspective, so that as-if-rational type arguments can be 
made. 1 will need some definitions for this discussion. 
Strategy x'e Sn¡ is strictly dominated in MiC Sn¡ relative to M.-ic nSnj !f there 
p!1 
exists xeSn¡ such that u¡(x, y) > u¡(x', y) for a1l ye~¡. Let Di(Mi , ~i) be the set of 
mixed strategies in Mi that are not strictly dominated in Mi relative to ~i' The strategy 
X' eSDi survives strict iterated admissibility (SIA) if there exist sequences of the fonn 
Di -
S = MiO, Mi ..... , MiT and [!Mk.O = M.-iO, M.-il, ... , M.-iT where Min+l = Di(Min, M.-in) 
and M-in = II Mkn • k:¡ti 
Strategies which do not survive SIA are not justifiable for a rational playero so if 
a nonnegligible pan of the population plays them a nonvanishing proportion of the time 
the dynamics cannot be thought of as behaving in a way that mimics the traditional 
economic notion of rationality. The usual justification for strong rationality assumptions 
is that in the long-ron behavior is close to rational due to unspecified selection processes. 
It is interesting, then, to find whether the replicator dynamics eliminate a1l but 
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admissible strategies in the long runo This is true for continuous time replicator dynamics 
but not for the discrete time case, as shown in Dekel-Scotchmer [6]. Nevertheless, 
Cabrales and Sobel [3] show that the result can be partially recovered and give sufficient 
conditions for discrete time dynamics to avoid in the limit strategies which do not survive 
SIA. The question now is whether a similar result is true for a model like the one pro-
posed in last section. 
The payoff function with respect to which 1 consider the strict domination is the 
average payoff function, u¡(j,x). Total payoff, ü¡(j,x), which ineludes the aggregate 
shocks to payoffs, can be different from u¡ (j,x), although on average they coincide. 1 wiIl 
show that the elimination of non-SIA strategies by the replicator dynamics is maintained 
even when transitory payoff perturbations and mutations are added to the model. 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that if mutation rates are small, and selection has 
been operating for a long time, the probability that nonnegligible proportions of the 
population are playing a non-SIA strategy is small. 1 cannot say that the weight of a 
strictIy dominated strategy will be small with probability one because it could happen 
that a streak of good luck makes the proportion of users of a generally bad strategy grow 
fora while. 
This result does not depend on the existence of an ergodic distribution, and it is 
not necessary for variances to be infinitely small. This is interesting because many other 
results in the literature of stochastic dynamics concem the limit of the ergodic distribu-
tion as the variance of the aggregate shocks goes to zero. 
Let r be any n¡ xl vector and 
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ni 
Vr(t) = n (xj(t))ri . 
J=1 
Suppose that r is a strategy vector for player i. If r is a non SIA strategy and V r 
is zero at least one of the pure strategies that have positive weight under r has to be zero. 
Proposition 1 
Let strategy pe Sni faíl strict iterated admissibility. If M~x(A.~)(Min(A.~)rl is 
J J 
bounded for all k having positive weight under p, as we let 1..-+0, there is ap such that if 
i -~.ax{ (Jjl } < (Jp 
J,1,1 
lim [ limsup E( V 2p( t»] = O 
I..~ l-+-
The proposition shows that the probability that the weight of a strictIy dominated 
strategy (or that of at least one member of its carrier in the case of a mixed strategy) is 
larger than any given positive number K, which may be as small as we want, will be very 
close to zero when selection has been operating for a long enough time provided that the 
variance of the noise is below a certain bound and the mutation rates are both small and 
not orders of magnitude apart from one another. 
1 don't need lO assume that (J goes to zero, but 1 need lO have a bound on it The 
smaller the advantage of the dominating strategy the stricter the bound The assumption 
about mutation rates is always satisfied in the games that Fudenberg and Harris study. In 
games with two strategies the only mutation rate to, say, strategy one is 1..12 , (remember 
that 1..11 is assumed to be equal to the mínimum over j :F- 1 of A.lj), so the maximum and 
the minimum coincide. They do have an assumption about ratios of mutation rates, but it 
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refers to ratios of rnutation rates to different strategies and it is not used to ensure that 
strictly dominated strategies have little weight asyrnptotically. They use it to ensure that 
the probability of getting out of a certain equilibriurn depends rnainly on the size of 
payoffs, and not on an increasing asyrnmetry of rnutation rates. 
I need four lernmas and sorne notation before I can proceed with the proof of the 
proposition. The first one is a direct application of standard theorerns on linear stochastic 
. 
differential equations, and the proofs of the other ones are given in the appendix. 
Let rnj( x, A.) = Ui(j, x-i ) - Ui( xi, x-i ) -l:A.~j . 
k 
The function rnj(x, A.) gathers all the terms in dxj that are rnultiplied by xj. 
M = M~{ I rnj( x" A.) I } , 
x, A.. J 
G = ~.ax{ Gjl } . 
J,I,I 
Let &tj = O if k :¡¡i: j and ().ij = 1. 
ni d t 
Ajs = LL J( &cj - xj(u) )Gj1dW1(u). 
j=ll=l s 
A~ gathers all the stochastic terms in dxj and integrates thern frorn S to t. 
Let r be any nix1 vector, and, 
ni . 
Vr(t) = .II(xj(t)tj • 
J=1 
By Ito's formula, which is the analog in differential stochastic calculus to the 
chain rule in ordinary calculus, 
ni 
dVp(t) = LPjrnj(xi(t»Vp(t)dt 
j=l 
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+ li i i [i (Ojm - X~(t»xj(t)cr~ll [i (~- X~(t»Xk(t)cr~ll [xf~t) x:~t) - Ojk X!~!)2]VP(t)dt 
2 J=1k=1l=1 m=1 m=1 J k J 
+ i + [LAjkXk(t)]Vp(t)dt + ii i (Ojm - X~(t))xj(t)cr~l X¡~t) Vp(t)dW1(t). 
j=1 Xj (t) k J=11=1m=1 J 
1 am going to collect now sorne terms and give them a name to save space. 
A(P)! collects the stochastic terms in dVp and integrates from s to t 
The function crp collects the detenninistic terms which are multiplied by the 
variances of the stochastic shocks. These are the terms that appear in stochastic caJ,culus 
but would not appear in detenninistic calculus when using the chain rule. 
In the remainder of the section 1 will suppress the superindex when it is clear 
that we are referring to strategies for player i. 
Lemmal 
b) V p(t) = exp [Íl:p'i m; (x(s), A) + o¡, (s) J ds + A(P)t ] V p (O) (3) 
+ ! exp [ti :p'iffiiX(U), A) + <Jp(+u + A(P)~ 1 r x;tS) [p~",,(S) lv p(s)ds . 
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+ l exp [I [rPjffij(X(U). A.) - f(x(u)) + "p(U) 1 du + A(P)~ 1 r x~tS) [f-A.jkXk (s) ]v. (s)ds 
+ 1 exp [1 [~pjmj(x(u), A) - f(x(u» + ap(u) )dU + A(P)~lf(X(S»Vp(S)dS . 
o s J 
Proof: See Gihman and Skorohod [13] p.37 
It is easy to see by differentiating that the solution to the ordinary differential 
equation; 
y(t) = a(t)y(t) + f(t); y(O) = y, (4) 
is given by 
y( t) = exp [la(s )ds 1 y+ ! [lar u)du 1 f(s)ds. (5) 
The x(t) process is the solution of equation (1), which is the stoehastic 
differential version of equation (4). 1.'0 go from (1) to (2), which is the stochastic analog 
of (5), since you cannot use differentiation it is necessary to use ItO's rule. Something 
similar applies to Vp(t). 
Lemma2 
a) E( exp ~A~) ~ exp [ dn2~2a2( t- S)]. 
b) E( exp ~A(P)~ ) ~ exp [ dn4~2a2( t - s )]. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
The proof of the proposition is going to proceed by taking expectations in equa-
tions (2) and (3). The assumption that strategy p is strictly dominated will make the • 
terms in those equations that contain the mj functions small, but we still need to know 
what happens with the term that contains the noise. The assumption on the variance plus 
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Lemma 2 assures that the noise terrn does not change the conclusions. 
Lemma3 
Let c > O and C(M,cr) = ecMC}'2 exp[ 6c2ctn2a2], where Cl is a constant 
independent of both the time index and the particular stochastic process we considero 
E( Xk (t)-C ) ~ C( M, cr)( Min[ Ajk ] )-c. 
J 
Proof: See the appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 1 : 
~ - -Let A¡ = {pe SI: p fails SIA and for all cr > O there is a cr < cr with 
N 
limlimsupE(V2p(t» > Ol, and assume that .uA¡ :1: 0 for a contradiction. Let K(pl be 
l.-tO t-+oo 1=1 
N 
such that p'eMiI{(p,)nMfK(p'}+l. Let p be a minimizer of K(P) on .uA¡. Let r=K(p). 
1=1 
Since pe Mir nM;+ 1 there is p 'e Mir such that 
u¡(p, x) - u¡(p', x) < O for all xe M-ir. (6) 
so that p' strictIy dominates p relative to M-ir. Let X consist of all those xe nSD¡ such 
b¡ 
that xt > O only if le MIcr. It follows by equation (6) that 
u¡(p, x) - u¡(p', x) < O for all xeX. (7) 
Let the set <;r = {xe PjnM~ l· c., is the set of pure strategies for player j that are not in 
Mjr. Let Xc = 1: 1: xf, that is, the sum of the weights of pure strategies (of players 
bijE 4r 
other than i) which are not in the sets CIcr . 
Let Mpp' = I Ma~[u¡(p, x) - u¡(p', x)] I + 1 . 
xensDJ j"; 
Then by equation (7) 
Since 
U¡(p, x)-U¡(p', x)-Mpp'xc <O forallxepSnj. 
J¡t¡ 
For the rest of the proof consider only A. small enough that 
L(Pj - p'j)mj( x, A.) - Mpp'Xc < O. 
j 
L(Pj - p'j)mj( x, A.) = u¡(p. x) - u¡(p'. x) - LL(Pj - P'j)A.~j. 
j j k 
this is satisfied when 
By the restriction placed on A.. m < O. 
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The function V 2(p-p, is something like a ratio of the weights of the dominated to 
the dominating strategy. Lernma 4 is going to show that the expectation of V2(p-p, is 
bounded. 
Lenuna4 
E(V2(p-p,)(t» ~ exp[2(m + 2crn4d)t]V2(p_p,(O) (8) 
+ [2M"". N + 2rC(M.cr)~)-1 M.axA.jk 1 [2(m + 2.r.4 d) ti [1 -exp [2(m + 2.rn4d)t]J. 
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Proof: See the appendix. 
Samuelson and Zhang show that strictIy dominated strategies disappear by 
showing that V p-p' goes to zero when there are no shocks. 1 can't do that because rnuta-
tions prevent the weights of strategies frorn becoming arbitrarily srnall. But at least 1 can 
show that E(V 2(P-p'» has a bound that is independent of the rnutation rates, if these are 
not orders of rnagnitude aparto This happens because far frorn the boundaries the dynam-
ics tend to make V p-p' srnall, and so the first term in equation (8) is srnall, but near the 
boundaries the rnovernent depends on rnutation rates to a greater extent, and the second 
term in equation (8) reftects thal 
Lemma 4 shows that there will always be enough users of the dominating stra-
tegy so that it can be imitated by the users of the dominated strategy. The nuniber of 
agents that play the dominated strategy could increase for two reasons. Sorne new 
players (rnutants) choose it by chance and sorne agents who were doing sornething else 
switch to the dominated strategy because they don't know of the dominating strategy. 
The rest of the proof of Proposition 1 dernonstrates that the accurnulation of those two 
types of players is slower than the losses of players who discover that the dominating 
strategy is better. 
Let b < l By Lemma lb, 
Then by the positivity of A, p', x and the exponential function, 
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By lernma lb' 
v 2p(t) = exp I! [2(fPjffij(X(S), A) - Mpp'Xc(s» + "2p(s) 1 ds + A(2P)L] V 2p(b) 
+ J exp 1  [2(~pjmj(x(u), A) - Mpp'xc(U» + (J2P(U»)dU + A(2P)t] ~ ~p(j) [LAjkXk(S)]V2P(S)dS 
b s J J XJ S k 
+ J exp IJ [2(~pjmj(x(u), A) - Mpp'Xc(u» + (J2p(U) )dU + A(2P)t]2Mpp'Xc(S)V2P(S)dS. 
b s J 
Now 1 divide the first line in the previous equation by, 
and since we showed that the last expression is less than one, 
V 2pO) ,; exp [[ [2q:(Pj - P 'j)ffij (x(s), A) - Mpp' Xc (s» + ">(p-p) (s) J ds + A(2(p-p '»~ lv 2(P-P) (b) 
+ J exp J [2(LPjmj(x(u), A) - Mpp'Xc(u» + (J2p(U) )dU + A(2p)~ L Lp. [~AjkXk(S) Jds t [t 1 2p· 
b s j j Xj (s) l k 
+ i exp [i [2~pjmj(x(u), A) - Mpp'Xc(u» + (J2p(U) )dU + A(2P)~l2Mpp,Xc(S)ds. 
b s J 
Taking expectations and applying lernmas 2 and 3, by definition of M, and taking the 
surnmation over j only over those indices for which Pj is strictly positive, 
E(V2p(t» ~ exp[(2m + 4a2n4d)(t - b)]E(V2.{p-pl(b» (9) 
+~C(M,(J)201inAjk)-(1-P¡)MkaxAjk [2(M+2a2n4d) J-1 [-l+exp [2(M+2a2n4d)(t-b) J] 
J 
+2Mpp'L L (MaxE(4(s»2)1/2 [2(M+2a2n4d)]-1 [-I+exP [2(M+2a2dn4)(t-b)J] 
j*i ke Cjr se (b. t) 
25 
1 have to show that for any positive nurnber <l, for all t larger than sorne tu and A 
srnaller than sorne Aa, E(V2p(t)) is srnaller than <l. Lernrna 4 shows that E(V2(p_p')(b)) is 
bounded by a constant C which depends only on rn, M and () when b is aboye sorne bao 
Choose t' such that t' - ba > O and 
Then for all t> t' choose b such that t - b = t' - bao This guarantees that the first line in 




= M~jk M:XA~ so by taking A' sufficiently srnall, if t> t', for all A < A' the 
surn of the first two lines in equation (9) will be srnaller than a. The third line in equation 
(9) can also be rnade as srnall as needed for all A srnaller than sorne AN when t is larger 
than sorne t N > t' because for all j;ti and all k in Cjr, lirnlirnsupE(xi(tP) = O. Let tu be 
t..-.<> t-+oo 
larger than t", and A smaller than A' and A" and the result follows. 
The following interpretation can be given to the proof. The first line of equation 
(9) says that few of the initial users of strategy p are still using it or have been replaced 
by imitators. The second says that the inexperienced new players and their imitators can-
not replace them, unless the initial level of p-strategists was very low. The third line 
allows us to extend the argument to strategies that are strictly dominated only after other 
strictIy dominated strategies have been eliminated. 
5. ERGODICITY 
Stochastic dynamics sornetirnes have the property that the time average of the 
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probability that the process hits a certain set goes to a limit that is independent of the 
starting point. This is useful beca use it allows the modeler to malee unique limiting pred-
ictions. It is also interesting because deterministic dynamics don't have that property 
unless there is global convergence, so ergodicity sets stochastic dynamics apart from 
detenninistic dynamics. The processes in the papers by Foster and Young [10], Kandori, 
Mailath and Rob [14] and others, have ergodic distributions. The authors proceed to 
identify the most likely states of the population when mutation rates are small. When 
mutation rates are small, however, the time that is necessary for the system to wipe out 
the influence of the initial condition may be very long. Ellison [8] shows that changing 
the matching technology from random matching to more general types·of interaction, can 
change the amount of time needed to converge to the ergodic distribution. Foster and 
. 
Young point out that for applications it may be more fruitful to estimate the variances of 
the shocks and the size of the mutation rates rather than to obtain the limit distributions 
when variances and mutations go to zero. 
I wil1 give sufficient conditions for the process defined in equation (1) to have an 
ergodic distribution. The context will determine whether these conditions are sensible. 
For example, it will be important for the result that the mutation rates are bounded away 
from zero. If the game is played always by the same people, you cannot invoke inexperi-
enced new players lo justify mutations. The justification of mutations in terms of experi-
mentation also becomes harder in that case. It is also important that the matrix of the 
varlance of the noise has fuIl rank. This implies that the sources of randomness have lo 
be somewhat independent between the different strategies. If strategies are, say, produc-
tion levels, it seems implausible to assume that a shock that affects the cost of producing 
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a certain amount of goods has no effect in the cost of producing a different amount. A 
trivial case in which the shocks are not sufficiently uncorrelated is the one in which the 
cost of production changes randomly for all strategies in the same amount. The 
differences between the payoffs to all strategies are not affected, and since the dynamics 
depend on the difference between the payoff to a strategy and the average population 
payoff, the dynamics are not affected by this type of shock. If the resulting deterministic 
dynarnics are not globally convergent there is not a unique limiting ergodic distribution. 
Nontrivial cases arise when the shocks are more complicated than this simple additive 
one but still not sufficiently diverse in origin to generate a regular variance matrix. 
The process 1 presented in equation (1) is ergodic when the matrix of the vari-
anee tenns has a rank higher than or equal to the total number of pure strategies. in the 
game and all the mutation rates are different from zero. The reason for this is that if the 
varianees satisfy the rank condition the process can move in every direction when it is in 
the interior of the simplex, and the mutation rates move the process away from the boun-
darles. In other words, as long as people are myopic and each strategy is being used by 
somebody (which is guaranteed by the presence of mutations) a string of suceesses or 
failures for different strategies due purely to random fluctuation in payoffs, can cause the 
population to reach all conceivable states infinitely often. 
and let 
Let x(t) be the solution to equation (1), which 1 will write 
dx(t) = a(x(t»dt + B(x(t»dW(t). 
ni 




The process x(t) belongs to /1 almost surely if x(O) belongs to /1 since Ldxj(t) = O for 
j=l 
i=l, ... , N, and dxj = O for xj equal to zero and one, for all i and j. I will only consider 
x(O) belonging to /1. 
Let P(s, x, E) be the probability that the process, starting at x, is at time s in the 
set E. Let r be the [i ni] xd rnatrix whose [~nk + j] th row is the d vector aj. 
_1 b1 
N 
Proposition 2 If the rank of r is equal to L ni, there exists an invariant measure 1t for 
k=l 
the process x'(t), and for all xe /1 and all Ee BA (the set of Borel subsets of /1 ) 
Proof: 
t 
lim 1. f P(s, x, E)ds = 1t(E). 
t-+oo t o 
The process x(t) has an invariant measure by Theorem 21 from Skorohod [26], 
because it is a Markov process in a compact metric space, /1. To show uniqueness 1 will 
apply Theorem 5.1 in Arnold and Kliemann [1]. Once the existence of a unique invariant 
distribution is established the result follows by Birkhoff's ergodic theorem (see Skorohod 
[26] theorem 1, or Arnold and Kliemann [1] p. 54). For the details of the proof of unique-
ness see the appendix. 
6. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS 
In this section I present an example which shows that the stochastic dynamics 
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can have an ergodic distribution whose weight is concentrated, when both mutation rates 
and the variances of the stochastic shocks are small, on an equilibrium which is not the 
one with the largest basin of attraction for the deterministic replicator dynamics. Further-
more, the ergodic distribution would concentrate its weight on a different equilibrium for 
the dynamics that Kandori, Mailath and Rob study. The distinction appears only when 
games with more than two players are considered. With two strategies and two players 
the stochastic dynamics of Kandori, Mailath and Rob and Fudenberg and Harris have 
ergodic distributions that put most of the weight on the same equilibrium for small vari-
ances and mutation rates. Young and Foster [33] consider an example in which the equili-
brium with the largest basin of attraction would not be the one to which the ergodic dis-
tribution gives the highest weight. In their example, however, the dynamics of Kandori, 
Mailath and Rob would have the same limiting ergodic distribution. 
Suppose now that members of the population are randomIy matched every 
period in groups of N players to playa game that has two strategies. The strategy played 
by player i is denoted Xi and Xi can be either 1 or 2. PayofIs are 
U¡(Xl' ••• , XN) = a mJn Xj - bx¡. 
J 
Given the random matching structure of the game, if we let X be the proportion 
of people in the population using strategy 2, the payoff to strategy 1 given x will be 
u(1, x) =a- b and the payoff to strategy 2 will be 
u(2, x) = 2axN + a(1 - xN) - 2b = axN + a - 2b. 
The game has two strict equilibria in pure strategies that are Pareto ranked. The 
detenninistic replicator dynamics converge to one of them from all initial states except 
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from the unstable mixed strategy equilibrium. The basin of attraction of the Pareto supe-
rior equilibrium is smaller when N is large. 
In the presence of mutants and random shocks to payofIs, if the changes in x are 
slow enough, its evolution can be modeled as, 
dx(t) = [X(t)(l - x(t»(ax(t)N - b) +A2(1 - x(t» - Al X(t») dt + x(t)(1 - x(t»cr dW(tX.10) 
Proposition 3 
a) The process x(t) defined in equation (10) has an ergodic distribution. 
b) If a> 2b the limit of the ergodic distribution puts probability one on the state x = 1 
where all the population is using the high efIort strategy, as A¡, A2 and cr go to zero, if 
Al . 
A2 IS bounded. 
Proof: 
See the appendix. 
The equilibrium that has more weight under the ergodic distribution is the one 
for which the temporary shocks to payofIs that will convince the people to switch to the 
other equilibrium are less likely to arise. In this model the difficulty in changing from a 
state where most of the people are playing one strategy to one where mostIy the other 
one is played, líes in getting the first few people to defect from the popular strategy, 
because it is more difficult to imitate something that almost nobody is doing. The first few " 
defectors have to see that playing the other strategy has been good lately, and that will 
happen when payofIs sufIer a shock that makes the strategy that is played by the majority 
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have a lower payoff than the altemative strategy. Then it is necessary to compare how 
likely are the shocks that move the dynamics from the different equilibria to know how 
the ergodic distribution looks like. When a > 2b the shocks necessary to move the 
dynamics from the Pareto dominant equilibrium to the other one are much more unlikely 
than the shocks that produce the opposite transition, if the variance of the shocks is small. 
Thus the Pareto dominant equilibrium has more weight under the ergodic distribution. 
In the model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob the factor that detennines which 
equilibrium has more weight under the ergodic distribution is the number of mutations 
necessary for the rest of the population to start thinking that it is a good idea to change 
their action. When N is large, less mutants are necessary to change from the Pareto dom-
inant equilibrium to the Pareto inferior equilibrium than the ones necessary to. do the 
opposite transition. Thus the Pareto dominated equilibrium has more weight under the 
ergodic distribution. 
When there are only two players in each match the two criteria, size of the 
shocks and number of mutants, coincide, which is why the papers of Fudenberg and 
Hanís and Kandori, Mailath and Rob give the same conclusions. 
The game presented in this section was studied experimentally by Van Huyck, 
Battalio and Beil ([29], [30)). The equilibrium selected in most of the experiments was 
the Pareto inferior one, contrary to what Proposition 3 would suggest This is not surpris-
ing since in the experimental setup there were no random shocks to payotIs and agents 
did not adjust their strategies in ways that were consistent with any of the stories 1 used to 
motivate the replicator dynamics. The model in Crawford [4] seems better adapted to 
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model the experimental framework. The model presented in this paper could be better 
suited for decisions where the payoffs to different choices are nol given lo the players in 
advance and are small compared to the cost of a careful consideration of the problem or 
of the difficulty of gathering information. 
7. THE SMALLWOOD-CONLISK DYNAMICS 
Section 4 showed that the result that replicator dynamics eliminates strictIy 
dominated strategies is robust to the presence of sorne types of shocks. In this section I 
present an example which shows that this result does not necessarily hold for more gen-
eral models of selection dynamics, even for sorne dynamics that are arbitrarily close to 
the replicator dynamics, in a parametric sense that 1 will specify latero 
1 will use the Smallwood-Conlisk dynamics 1 described in section 2. As I 
showed in that section the replicator dynamics are a member of that family of dynamics, 
when the parameter a takes the value of one. Smallwood and Conlisk [27] characterize 
completely the set of limit points for the dynamics of their consumer choice problem. 
The game theoretic setup does not allow such a complete analysis as the consumer 
choice case, because the function that determines payoffs may depend on the proportions 
of the population that use every strategy in a game, but in the Smallwood and Conlisk 
model quality does not change with the proportion of people using a product. Neverthe-
less, the following can be said about the game dynamics. 
Proposition 4 
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Every pure strategy profile is a fixed point of the breakdown dynamics. a) For 
(l < 1 it is locally unstable, b) for (l > 1 it is locally stable. 
Proof: 
Rewriting the dynamics in the way Smallwood and Conlisk do, 
. . x;(t)a ¡ C - U¡(j,x-¡(t» - a ¡ [ [ c - U¡(j,x-¡(t» - al [x~(t) la-1ll x~(t+1)-x~(t)+ ~ x·(t) 1- . . . 
J - J LX~(t)a ~ b - a J c - u¡(r,x-1(t» - a xj(t) 
It 
If xj(t) is sufficientIy close to one, and (l is more than one then the second tenn is 
positive and therefore xj(t+l) > xj(t). lterating this argument yields the desired conelu-
sion about local stability. A similar argument proves the local instability of pure strategy 
profiles when (l < 1. 
The local stability and instability of pure strategy profiles when (l is greater than 
and less than one respectively, is independent of the precise magnitude of payoffs. And 
so it is possible for the dynamies to converge to a strietIy dominated strategy when (l is 
greater than one and to diverge from a strict equilibrium when (l is less than one. This 
happens because if nearly everybody uses the same strategy, users of other strategies 
who decide to ehange will do it with high probability 10 the "leading" strategy. At the 
same time, many agents are eeasing to use the "leading" strategy, because even a very 
good strategy will sometimes faíl to perform satisfaetorily due 10 random faetors. The 
parameter (l eontrols which of these effeets dominates. When neither dominates, superior 
quality can overcome the effects of popularity and random failure. The elimination of 
strietIy dominated strategies is sensitive to the formulation of the model. In faet, strietIy 
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dominated strategies need not be eliminated even for parameter values that are arbitrarily 
close to one, the case of replicator dynamics. 
One possible criticism to this result is that while functions with a similar a 
parameter are close by in the sense that Max I fa(x) - fa,(x) I is small when a-a' is close 
xed 
to zero, the first derivative of f I and fa are very different near the vertices of the simplex, 
even for values of a very close to 1, and the result depends on the behavior near the ver-
tices of the simplex. 
Another criticism is that when the parameter is close to but greater than one the 
basin of atttaction of the equilibrium where everybody is playing a strictIy dominated 
strategy is small. In the presence of stochastic shocks one could conjecture that the 
. 
population would get knocked very easily out of an equilibrium with a small basin of 
attraction, and therefore the system would spend on average very little time near that 
equilibrium, even if the dynamics are not precisely the replicator dynamics. 
The example I will present next is intended 10 show that this is not necessarily 
the case. The reason is that for stochastic dynamics there are factors other than the size of 
the basin of attraction that determine the distribution of future outcomes. In particular, 
myexample depends on the form of the variance term. 
Suppose that in a game with two strategies instantaneous payoffs are determined 
as follows, 
dÜl (t) = ul (Xl (t), X2(t» + X2(t)Gl dW 1 (t), 
dÜ2(t) = U2(X2(t), Xl (t» + X2(t)G2dW2(t), 
where (JI ~ O and (J2 > O. 
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The variance of the shocks in this case, unlike in the model presented in section 
3 depends on the number of players using strategy 2. 
The se model when there are two strategies can be written, 
X2(t)XI (t)a 
Xl (t)a + X2(t)a ' 
and X2(t) = 1 - Xl (t) . 
The continuous time version with shocks to payoffs and mutations wiIl be then, 
and dxl (t) = - dx2(t) . If Xl (O) + X2(0) = 1, then Xl (t) + X2(t) = 1, for all t 
Let's define now, 
The process W(t) thus defined is a one dimensional Wiener process. The pro-
cess x(t) = Xl (t) = 1 - X2(t) can be studied using the theory of one-dimensional lro 
processes, which allows us to know the exact fonn of the ergodic distribution if one 
exists. 
Suppose that UI (x, 1-x) = u and u2(l-x, x) = U for all XE [O, 1], and u < U. Let 
e -U - a (J2Iy2(a-I) + (J~(l- y)2(a-l) c - u - a _ B - A R(X) - , and 
b-a - , b-a - '1-' - (ya + (l_y)a)2 
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We have then, 
dx(t) = o(x(t»dt + x(t)(1- X(t»2~1/2dW(t). (11) 
Proposition S 
a) The process x(t) defined in equation (11) has an ergodic distribution. 
b) The limit of the ergodic distribution of x(t) as A¡, A2' (JI and (J2 go to zero gives all 
(JI (J2 Al A2 
the weight to x = 1 if a > 1 and - , -, -;¡- , -;¡- are bounded. (J2 (JI A2 Al 
Proof: 
See the appendix. 
In this example, for small values of the variances and the mutation rates, the pro-
cess will spend very little time outside the areas where x is close to one, provided that the 
popularity parameter is bigger than one. This happens despite the fact that the basin of 
attraction of the equilibrium where x is one will be very small if (J is close 10 one. The 
reason for this is that the first strategy is worse on average, but it rarely fails for a lot of 
people at the same time, which is what you need in this framework to escape from a state 
in which a strategy is used because it it the most popular. The second strategy is usually 
better but in sorne periods it performs badly. Hit does so for a suf6ciently long time the 
first strategy will become very popular and from then on its steady perfonnance will 
make it hard to beat. 
The variance of shocks on this example could depend on Xl and X2 in a more 
general way. For example, instead of X2(t)(Jl dWl (t) we could have 
37 
(010 + 011 Xl (t) + 012X2(t)dW 1 (t). If 010 or 011 were different from zero the example 
would not be possible. The purpose of the example is to show that thinking that the sto-
chastic dynarnics will spend less time near equilibria which have small basins of attrac-
tion under detenninistic dynarnics than near equilibria with large basins of attraction is 
wrong unless additional assumptions are made. 
The problem now is finding examples of situations with the required variance 
structure. One such situation arises when deciding whether to participate or not in a game 
of bingo, where each participant pays a fixed amount and the randomIy selected winner 
receives a portion of the total amount paid by the participants. Sorne scientific endeavors 
also have the property that the value of the research done increases with the number of 
scientists working in the field, but only one or a few lucky researchers will receive credit 
. 
for the discoveries. More precisely, suppose that M individuals have to choose between 
participating or not in a lottery. Denote by N the number of people who decide to partici-
pateo If they don't participate they get nothing and pay nothing. If they do, they obtain the 
prize, wonh N/2, with a probability of l/N, and the cost of entering the contest is 1. 
Under these conditions the payofffor a contestant is -1/2 + «N-1)/4)1/2w, where w is a 
random variable with mean O and variance 1. If we denote the nonparticipation strategy 
by one and the proportion of nonparticipants by X, u(l, x) = O and u(2, x) = -1/2 + 
(M(N-1)/4N)1/2x1/2w. 
De Long, Shleifer, Surnrners and Waldmann [7] have a model for the stock 
market where sorne of the agents (noise traders) have an expectation about the price of a 
stock that deviates from the rational expectation by a random amount The rest of the 
agents have rational expectations. With this setup the payoff to both types of agents has a 
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variance that depends on how many noise traders there are. Another game where the 
variance of the payofIs depend on the number of users of a strategy would be one in 
which producers in a market choose between two technologies. One of those technolo-
gies produces goods with a random quality that changes over time, but is identical for all 
users of that technology. The quality of the goods produced with the alternative tech-
nique doesn't change. Costs are also deterministic. Demand depends on average quality 
in the whole market. If the proportion of users of the random technique is x, the price is 
P((l-x)+xw), where w is the random quality of the technique. The variance of payoffs 
will depend on x through price in this case. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper 1 extend to games with more than two players and strategies 'which 
are not necessarily symmetric two results found by Fudenberg and Harris [11]. First, 1 
show that strictIy dominated strategies have little asymptotic weight even in the presence 
of shocks to payoffs if mutation rates are small. Then 1 show that unique ergodic distribu-
tions exist Nevertheless, at the present stage it doesn't seem easy to say much about the 
transition probabilities on large time intervals analytically, unless one assumes that the 
variances go to zero. 
The present approach is complementary to the one Kandori, Mailath and Rob 
[14] or Young [32] use, because it studies very large populations, where their model is 
less powerful, because independent mutations are much less likely to take the process 
very far from the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium, even for nonnegligible muta-
tion rates. As Ellison [8] studies, if the matching technology were difIerent, for example 
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if the chances of being matched with a few individual s were not very small, then low 
mutation rates wouldn't be that much of a problem. In such a case the potential for 
supergame effects is much larger,though. 
Foster and Young introduced the study of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. As I 
have said, their model did not discriminate between mutations and shocks to payoffs. For 
their purposes, establishing the existence of a unique ergodic measure, and analyzing the 
limit of that measure when variances are taken to zero, this is not very important But it 
becomes more relevant if one wants to distinguish whal are the factors thal cause ergodi-
city, and which ones are nOl essential, especially if one thinks that ergodicity is a coun-
terintuitive property for sorne situations. 
. 
None of the justifications 1 gave for the replicator dynamics provide very strong 
foundations outside of the realm of biological games. Bul these slories show that with 
fairly weak assumptions on rationality one can conclude that strictly dominated strategies 
can be eliminated. However, the result seems lO depend quile sensitively on assumptions. 
More research needs 10 be done, allowing more heterogeneity in the way agents behave, 
and the amount of information they process lo be more confident about the force of 
aggregate rationality, which seems to be the basis for the belief that the behavior that 
eventualIy prevails has 10 be the best. Stahl [28] studies a model with agents who differ 
in their abilities to best respond to the present population. My paper explores a model in 
which payoffs are constantly changing around a central value. It would be interesting to 
see the results obtained when payoffs can change in more general ways, since in that case 
it may not be possible lo always use the same strategy successfully and the definition of a 






a) E( exp ~Ab ) ~ exp [ dn2~2a2( t - S)]. 
b) E( exp ~A(P)~ > ~ exp [ dn4~2a2( t - s>]. 
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a) Let Zt( x) = exp [L~ h~( ~j - Xj(U) )<JjldW1(u) _1. Í1: [~2~{ ~j - Xj(u) )<Jjl r dU]. 
lJ& 2&1 J 
By applying lta's rule to the exponential function we have, 
t 
Zt( x ) = 1 + 1:1: JZu( x }2~{ ~j - Xj(u) )<JjldW1(u). 
1 j I 
By Novikov's [22] sufikient condition to Girsanov's theorem Zt( x) is a martingale if 
. 
E [exp [ ; Ir [PJl( q.j - Xj(ul lOjl r dU]] < - fors ';t<-, 
Wbich in this case is true because o ~ Xj(t) ~1. 
IfZt( x) is a martingale E( Zt( x» = 1. Using that and H&lder's inequality, 
lfl [[ [1 t 2 ]]]lfl E( exp ~A~ ) = [E( Zt( x »] E exp "2!t [r 2~{ ~j - Xj(U»<Jjl] du S exp [ n2d~2a2( t - s) l 
lbe same argument applies for b). 
Lemma3 
E( Xt(t)~ ) S C( M, <J)( ~[ A.,;t ] )~. 
J 
Proof: 
Since "" (1) = exp [ 1""'( x(sl, A )ds + A~ 1 "" (Ol + !exp [ !"'" (X(ul, A)dU + Ab ] 1"1< ",,(s)ds. 
and by the positivity oí the exponential function, A. and x; 
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E( Xk(t)-<: ) ~ E [[ j exp [ fmk( x(u), A )du + L~( Ojk - Xj(u) )<Jj1dW1(u) ]LAjkXj(S)dS]-<: ] 
t-l s 1 J s k 
~ecM( ~nAjk )-<:E [[ J exp [L~ J( ~j - Xj(U) )<Jj1dW1(u) lds l-<: l, 
J t-l 1 J s 
which by HBlder's inequality 
,; ccM( ~ )-< { E I [ exp [ H .L ( Sr.j - Xj(u) )<>" dW, (u) 1 rIr 
[E [[ llexp [-H .l,(~ -Xj(u) )GpdW,(u) lds r 1 r 
,; CcM( ~ )-< { E [ cxp [ H 1.< ~ -x; (u) X -2c )<>pdWI(U) l] r 
{ E I SU}) exp [1:1: j 2c( ~j - Xj(u) )<Jj1dWl(U) lllln.. t-1Sist 1 j t-l 
which by lernma 2 and HBlder's inequality 
S ecM( ~jk )-<: [ exp [ dn24c2cr ] ] In. 
{ E [1 SU)) exp [1:1: j 2c( &tj - Xj(u) )<JJ1dW¡(U) - 21 1: j [1: 2c( ~ - Xju )<JJ1 J2 ds] ]2]}1/4 t-1Sist ¡ j t-1 ¡ t-1 j 
lE {[>-~exp [f.11 [7 2c(~ -Xi> )Gp r dslrlr· 
By tite proof of lernma 2 we know that, 
exp 1:~ J 2c( &cj - Xj(U) )<Jj1dW¡(u) - 2"1: J [~2c( &cj - Xju )<rj1 J ds [ SI I 2 1 ¡ J t-1 1 t-l J 
is a martingale. and so we can use NoviIéov's [21] martingale moment inequalities 10 
bound tite expectation of the square of its supremum. 
E( Xk(t)-<: ) S ecM( ~ )-<: [ exp [ dn24c2cr ) J In. cln. exp[ ~dn2a2]. 
Since Cl is a constant independent of both the time index and the particular martingale. 
we are done. 
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Lemma4 
E(V2(p-p')(t)) s exp[2(m + 2a2n4d)t]V2(p-p')(Q) 
+ [2Mw' N + 2rC(M,(Jl~¡-1 ~ 1 [2(m + 2o'n4dl r [1 -exp [2(m + 2o'n4dlt]]. 
Proof: 
By Lemma lb') we know, 
v 2ú>-t»( tl = exp [! [~(p; -p 'j lll1; (x(s l, Al - M,p' Xc (s» + <>2(p-p) (sl J ds + A(2(p-p ') l~ lv 2ú>-t» (O) 
+ i exp [i [2Q:(Pj - p'j)lIlj(x(u), A.) - Mpp'Xc(u» + (J2<p-p') (u) )dU + A(2(p-p'»~l2Mpp'Xc(S)V2(p-p')(S)ds 
o s J 
By the definition of m and (J2(p-p')' 
V2(p-p')(t) ~ exp[2(m + a2n4d)t + A(2(P-p'»h]V2(p-p')(Q) 
+ jexP[2(m + crn4d)(t - s) + A(2(P-p'»!] !2Mpp'N + l:-L( ) ~axA.jk]dS. 
o j Xj S J.k 
Taking expectations, 
E(V 2(p-p')(t» ~ exp[2(m + crn4d)t](E(exp[A(2(p-p'»h]»V 2(p-p')(O) 
+ jexp[2(m + crn4d)(t - s)](E(exp[2A(p-p')~])IJ2 [2Mpp,N + L lE 1+]]lfl ~lds. 
o j Xj (s) k 
which by Lemmas 2 and 3, 
~ exp[(2m + crn4d)t]exp [ 2n4da2t]V2(p-p')(O) 
+ !exp [2(m + o'n4d)(t - s) + 2n4W( t - S )1 ! 2Mpp. N + 2r C(M,(J)~)-l ~ ]ds. 
Tbe Lemma then follows by integration. 
44 
N 
Proposition 2 If the rank of r is equal to r, ni, there exists an invariant measure 1t for 
k=l 
the process x'(t), and for aU xe Il and aH Ee BA (the set of Borel subsets of 6) 
Proof: 
t 
tim 1.. J P(s,x,E)ds = 1t(E). 
t~ t o 
The process x(t) has an invariant measure by Theorem 21 from Skorohod [26], 
because it is a Mark.ov process in a compact metric space, 6. To show uniqueness 1 will 
apply Theorem 5.1 in Arnold and Kliemann [1]. Once the existence of a unique invariant 
distribution is established the result follows by Birkhoff's ergodic theorem (see Skorohod 
[26] theorem 1, or Arnold and Kliemann [1] p. 54). 
To establish uniqueness 1 need three lemmas and sorne definitioDS. 
Lemma5 
N 
Hx is in 6, the rank ofB(x) is equal to r,(n¡-l). 
¡=l 
Proof: 
Let B '(x) be the matrix formed by suppressing from B(x) the rows correspond-
ing to the last sttategy, ni, of aIl players, and suppose the rows in B'{x) are not linearly 
independent. Then there exist aj for j = 1, ... , n¡-l, i = 1, ... , N, such that 
i i 1 ajxj [aj - 1: x~a~l = O, 
l=lFl k=l 
and there is sorne aj ~ O. The coefficient that multiplies a~ in the previous expression is 
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¡n¡-1 1 equal to -X~i ~ ajxi . Since all xl *0 by assurnption for j = 1, ... , ni, and i = 1, ... , N 
. J=1 
and sorne aj*Ü also by assurnpúon, there is an i such that -X~i ~ ajxj *Ü, which ¡n.-1 1 
J=1 
N 
implies that the rank of r is not equal to L ni. This is a contradicúon. 
k=1 
Lemma6 
Let x' be in the neighborhood of radius O around x, N6(X), and let 
e = I Ix - x' I l. Let r' be the first exit time of the systern, 
x(t) = a(x(t» + B(x(t»C, x(o) = x' 
o-e fromN6(X), then M M <r', where aM =Max{ l&i(u) I l, BM = Max {IBij(u)l} 
a +B le I i.ueA i.j,ueA 
and ICI = ~IC¡ 1. 
1 
Proof: 
o-e Let t S; M M ' then, 
a +B ICI 
so 
l 
o - e ~ (aM + BM le I)t ~ 11 J(a(x(s» + B(x(s»C)ds 1 1 
o 
l 
o ~ 11 J(a(x(s» + B(x(s»C)ds 11 + II x' - xii 
o 
l 
~ 1I x' + ¡(a(x(s» + B(x(s»C)ds - x 11 = Ilx(t) - x II 
o 
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Por a set UcA, 1 denote U, intU, UC and au, the closure, the interior, the com-
plement and the boundary of U in A respectively. Let the deterministic control system 
a~~t) = a(c¡,(t» + B(c¡,(t))u(t), (12) 
where the admissible controls u:R + ~Rd are the piecewise constant functions. Let 6+ (x) 
be the set of points reachable from x forward in time, 
6+ (x) = u6+ (t,x), 
t>O 
6+(t,x) = (y: there exists an admissible u:R+ ~Rd such that y = c¡,(t;u,z) 1, where 
,(t;~x) = solution of (12) starting from x at time O and using control function u. 
DEFlNITION. A set ~ in A is called invariant control set for (12) if 
6+(x) = D 'VxeD, 
and D is maximal with respect to inclusion. 
Lemma 7. 
For all xe A, 6+ (x) = A. 
Proof: 
Suppose that for sorne z, 6+ (z) * A. 
If ze iotA there is ye A and r > O such that Nr(y)()6+ (z) = 0, where Nr(y) is the 
ball of radius r around y. We can choose y and r such that é)Nr(Y)na9+ (z) = x, for sorne-
xe iotA such that x + e(x-y)e 6+(z) for all e greater than zero and smaller than sorne e'. 
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In the proof of Lernma 5 I showed that the rows of the matrix B '(x), formed by 
suppressing from B(x) the rows eorresponding to the last strategy, ni, of a11 players, are 
N 
l:<n¡-l) 
independent for a11 xe intA. Then for a11 ve Ri-l there is a v' e Rd sueh that 
B'(x)v' = v. This, together with the faet that the row of B(x) eorresponding to the last 
strategy, ni, of a1l players is equal to the sum of the preceding ni - 1 rows, and also that 
the element of the vector (x - y + a(x» eorresponding to the last strategy, ni, of a1l 
players is equal to the sum of the preceding ni - 1 elements, implies that there is a vector 
C sueh that, a(x)+B(x)C = -(x-y). 
By eontinuity of a(.) and B(.) there is sorne a> o, sueh that for a1l x' with 
Ilx-x'll<a 
r Ila(x) - a(x) + B(x) - B(x')ell < 2" (13) 
Let e<Min! M ~ , e'}. Let x"=x+e(x-y). Since e<e', 
2(a +B lel) + 1 
je"e e+(z), and sinee e < a, x"e N6(X). For the de.terministie control system in (12), let 
+(0) = x", and u(t) = e, then 
t 
+(t) = x + e(x-y) + /(a(+(8» + B(+(s»C)ds. 
o 
Since a(x) + B(x)e = - (x - y), 
t t 
+(t) - y = (x-y)(1+e) - /(x-y)ds + /(a(.(s»-a(x) + (B(.(s» - B(x»C)ds. 
o o 
For t < r" , 8inee .(t)e N6(X), (13) holds, thU8 
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O-E .-
For t * = M M ' which by Lernma 6 is smaller than r 
a +B lel 
Since E < M ~ ,(14) implies that C\>(t*)e Nr(y). But since C\>(t*) can 
2(a +B lel) + 1 
be reached from x" by an admissible control, e, and x"ea+(z), x(t)ea+(z). So 
Nr(y)na+ (z)~. This is a contradiction. 
Suppose instead that for sorne ze dA, a+ (z) ~ A. In the deterministic control sys-
tem in (12) let C\>(O) = z and let u(t) = O. Then, 
t 
c!>(t) = z + Ja(c!>(s»ds 
O 
For t small enough c!>i (t) > O if z¡ > O. Since a¡ (z) > O for i such that z¡ = O. by 
continuity c!>¡(t) > O for t small enough. So for t small and u(t) = O, c!>(t. u; z)eA. But Ijust 
showed that a+ (x) = A for x in the interior of A. Thus a+ (z) = A, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 7 establishes that there is on1y one control set in A. Lemma 5 proves that 
B(x) 's rank is at least the dimension of A if x is in the interior of A. So Lemmas 5 and 7 
show that the assumptions needed lO apply Theorem 5.1 in Arnold and Kliemann are 
satisfied for our process. Thus there is a unique invariant distribution. 
Proposiüon 3 
a) The process x(t) defined in equation (10) has an ergodic distribution. 
b) If a > 2b the limit of the ergodic distribution puts probability one on x = 1 as 
A 
Al, A2 and (J go to zero, if A: is bounded. 
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Proof: 
This proof, as well as that of the next proposition borrows heavily from the proof 
of propositions 3 and 4 in Fudenberg and Harris [8], so that readers familiar with their 
work can follow my proofs more easily. 
a) Let O(x) = x(1 - x)(axN - b) - AIX + 1..2(1- x). Let an arbitrary ZE (O, 1), and 
x(O) x O(y) 
11 = J exp {-2J r 2~ dy}dx, 
o z (l-y) 
1 x §<y) 
12 = J exp {-2J r 2~ dy)dx, 
x(O) z (1-y) 
2 JX O(y) 
D(x) = 2 2.-2 exp 2 . .2 2-'- dy . 
x (l-x) o- z 1 (l-y) o-
The process x(t) is ergodic (see Theorem 1.17 of Skorohod [26]), if 11 and 12 are 
1 
infinitc and ID(x)dx is finite. 
o 
O(y) . A Al 
But . .2 2.-2 dy, IS of order -:2 around y = -O and of order - 2 
1 (l-y) o- y (l-y) 
around y = 1. Thus 11 and 12 are infinite. D(x) is of order exp(-Al/x)/x2 in a neighbor-
1 
hood of x = O and of order exp( -~/(l-x»/(1-x)2 in the vicinity of x = 1 , so ID(x)dx is 
o 
finite. 
b) The density of the ergodic distribution is proportional to, 
x 
2 J §(y) D(x) = 2 2-'- exp 2 . .2 2.-2 dy. 
x (l-x) o- 7.1 (l-y) o-
This implies, as 1 showed in the last example, 
x :y(y) 
Let -y(y) = o(y) + (2y - l)y(l - y)a2, and F(x) = exp2j .¡. 2a2 dy. 
z (l-y) 
Let Yl be the smallest ye [O, 1] such that -y(y) = O. 
Since -y(y) > -by -AIY + A2(1-y) - cry then Yl> ~ cr 
b+ Al + 
Since 1\)') > O for y < Yl ,F(y) < F(Y1). 
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Al 
Choose Y2 so that ayr - b > b + k for some k > O. Let Y3 = 1 - b+k' Since 
1\)') > O in [Y2. Y31. then F(y) is increasing in that intervalo 
Letnowxe[y¡. Y2) and x'e(Y2. Y31. 
.ffU. - ex 2 :y(y) d + :y(y) d 
I
x. Y2 1 
F(x) - p L '¡'(1_y)2cr Y ! '¡'(1_y)2cr Y 
~ ~ b+k 1 d b+o- + l d 
I
x. [ A 1 IY2[.-2 A. 1 1 
exp cr L y(l-y) - y(1- y)2 Y - ! y(l-y) y(l _ y)2 Y 
2 [ A.I 1 ~ exp cr -(b+k)(ln(1-x')-ln(1-Y2» + (b+a2+AI)lnx + (b+cr)ln(1-Y2) + A,l ln(1-X')- (l-x') 
b+t/4 
If x' ~ 1 - Al b+k then given the definition of x' and YI. 
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[
XJ' A2Y(1-Y)-AIY YJ2 (B+Al +2a~)y 1 ~ exp 2 . .2 4 2 dy - . .2 4 2 dy 
Y2 Y (l-y) aM x Y (l-y) a m 
A a Al~ 
Since '\ 1 and ~ is bounded, if x' > 1 - -T- and Al is small F(x') > F(x). Given that 
1\.2 am A 
for y < Yl , F(y) < F(YI) and that F(y) is increasing in the interval [Y2, Y3], this implies 
that F(x') > F(y) for all y < x'. 
Now let the ratio of probabilities under the ergodic distribution, 
Since the previous expression tends to infinity as A¡, ~, al, a2 tend to zero all 
thc probabiIity mISS tends 10 be concenttared in thc interval [1 - ~: • + Since A, 
goes to zero the result follows. 
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